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Abstract
The security of computers is at risk because of information
leaking through physical outputs such as power, tempera-
ture, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Attackers can use
advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensi-
tive data from these sidechannels.
To address this problem, this paper presents Maya, a sim-
ple and effective solution against power side-channels. The
idea is to re-shape the power dissipated by an application
in an application-transparent manner using control theory
techniques – preventing attackers from learning any infor-
mation. With control theory, a controller can reliably keep
power close to a desired target value even when runtime
conditions change unpredictably. Then, by changing these
targets intelligently, power can be made to appear in any
desired form, appearing to carry activity information which,
in reality, is unrelated to the application. Maya can be im-
plemented in privileged software or in simple hardware. In
this paper, we implement Maya on two multiprocessor ma-
chines using Operating System (OS) threads, and show its
effectiveness and ease of deployment.
1 Introduction
There is an urgent need to secure computer systems against
the growing number of cyberattack surfaces. An important
class of these attacks is that which utilizes the physical out-
puts of a system, such as its power, temperature or electro-
magnetic (EM) emissions. These outputs are correlated with
system activity and can be exploited by attackers to recover
sensitive information [24, 26, 31, 49, 56].
Many computing systems ranging from mobile devices to
multicore servers in the cloud are vulnerable to physical side
channel attacks [26, 28, 31, 49, 51, 55]. With advanced signal
measurement and analysis, attackers can identify many de-
tails like keystrokes, password lengths [49], personal data
like location, browser and camera activity [26, 31, 51], and
the bits of encryption keys [24].
Many defenses against physical sidechannels have been
proposed which aim to keep the physical signals constant or
noisy [7, 14, 24, 38, 42, 52, 53]. However, all these techniques
require new hardware and, hence, existing systems in the
field are left vulnerable. Trusted execution environments like
Intel SGX [30] or ARM TrustZone [6] cannot “contain” phys-
ical signals and are ineffective to stop information leaking
through them [10, 12, 28].
To address this problem, we seek a solution that is simple
to implement and is effective against power side-channels.
The idea is to rely on privileged software or simple hard-
ware to distort, in an application-transparent manner, the
power dissipated by an application — so that the attacker
cannot glean any information. Obfuscating power also re-
moves leakage through temperature and EM signals, since
they are directly related to the computer’s power [12, 13, 28].
Such a defense can prevent exploits that analyze applica-
tion behavior at the scale of several milliseconds or longer,
such as those that infer what applications are running, what
data is used in the camera or browser, or what keystrokes
occur [26, 49].
A first challenge in building an easily deployable power-
shaping defense is the lack of configurable system inputs
that can effectively change power. Dynamic Voltage and Fre-
quency Scaling (DVFS) is an input supported by nearly all
mainstream processors [4, 5, 9, 36, 37, 43]. However, DVFS
levels are only a few, and the achievable range of power val-
ues depends on the application — compute-intensive phases
have higher values of power and show bigger changes with
DVFS, while it is the opposite for memory-bound applica-
tions. Injecting idle cycles in the system [25, 44] is another
technique, but it can only reduce power and not increase it.
The second and more important challenge is to develop an
algorithm that reshapes power to effectively eliminate any
information leakage. This is hard because applications vary
widely in their activity profile and in how they respond to
system inputs. Attempts to maintain constant power, insert
noise into power signals, or simply randomize DVFS levels
have been unsuccessful [26, 35, 55]. These techniques only
tend to add noise, but do not mask application activity [35,
55].
In this work, we proposeMaya, a defense architecture that
intelligently re-shapes a computer’s power in an application-
transparent manner, so that the attacker cannot extract ap-
plication information. To achieve this, Maya uses a Multiple
Input Multiple Output (MIMO) controller from control the-
ory [41]. This controller can reliably keep power close to a
target power level even when runtime conditions change un-
predictably. By changing these targets intelligently, power
can be made to appear in any desired form, appearing to
carry activity information which, in fact, is unrelated to the
application.
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Maya can be implemented in privileged software or in
simple hardware. In this paper, we implement Maya on two
multicore machines using OS threads. The contributions of
this work are:
1. Maya, a new defense system against power side-channels
through power re-shaping.
2. An implementation of Maya using only privileged soft-
ware. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first soft-
ware defense against power side-channels that is application-
transparent.
3. The first application of MIMO control theory to side-
channel defense.
4. An analysis of power-shaping properties necessary to
mask information leakage.
5. An evaluation of Maya using machine learning-based
attacks on two different real machines.
2 Background
2.1 Physical Side-Channels
Physical side-channels such as power, temperature, and elec-
tromagnetic (EM) emissions carry significant information
about the execution. For example, these side channels have
been used to infer the characters typed by a smartphone
user [26], to identify the running application, login requests,
and the length of passwords on a commodity smartphone [49],
and even to recover the full encryption key from a cryptosys-
tem [23].
All power analysis attacks rely on the principle that the dy-
namic power of a computing system is directly proportional
to the switching activity of the hardware. Since this activity
varies across instructions, groups of instructions, and applica-
tion tasks, they all leave distinct power traces [26, 40, 45, 49].
By analyzing these power traces, many details about the
execution can be deduced. Temperature and EM emissions
are also directly related to a computer’s power consumption
and techniques to analyze them are similar [12, 13, 28].
Physical side-channels can be sensed through special mea-
surement devices [24], unprivileged hardware and OS coun-
ters [1, 37], public amenities like USB charging stations [51],
malicious smart batteries [26] or remote antennas that mea-
sure EM emissions [16, 17]. In cloud systems, an application
can use the thermal coupling between cores to infer the
temperature profile of a co-located application [28].
After measuring the signals, attackers search for patterns
in the signal over time like phase behavior and peak locations,
and its frequency spectrum after a Fourier transform. This
can be done through Simple Power Analysis (SPA), which
uses a single trace [16, 26, 49], or Differential Power Analysis
(DPA), which examines the statistical differences between
thousands of traces [24, 55].
The timescale over which the signals are analyzed is de-
termined by the information that attackers seek. For cryp-
tographic keys, it is necessary to record and analyze sig-
nals over a few microseconds or faster [24]. For higher-
level information like the details of the running applications,
keystrokes, browser data, and personal information, signals
are analyzed over timescales of milliseconds or more [26, 49,
51]. The latter are the timescales that this paper focuses on.
2.2 Control Theory Techniques
Using control theory [41], we can design a controller K that
manages a system S (i.e., a computer) as shown in Figure 1.
The system has outputs y (e.g., the power consumed) and
configurable inputsu (e.g., the DVFS level). The outputs must
be kept close to the output targets r . The controller reads
the deviations of the outputs from their targets (∆y = r − y),
and sets the inputs.
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Figure 1. Control loop.
The controller is a state machine characterized by a state
vector, x(T ), which evolves over time T . It advances its state
to x(T + 1) and generates the system inputs u(T ) by reading
the output deviations ∆y(T ):
x(T + 1) = A × x(T ) + B × ∆y(T )
u(T ) = C × x(T ) + D × ∆y(T ) x(0) = 0 (1)
where A, B, C , and D are matrices that encode the controller.
Themost useful controllers are those that actuate onMultiple
Inputs and sense Multiple Outputs (MIMO) at the same time.
Designers can specify multiple parameters in the control
system [41]. They include he maximum bounds on the devi-
ations of the outputs from their targets, the differences from
design conditions or unmodeled effects that the controller
must be tolerant to (i.e., the uncertainty guardband), and
the relative priority of changing the different inputs, if there
is a choice (i.e., the input weights). With these parameters,
controller design is automated [18].
3 Threat Model
We assume that attackers try to compromise the victim’s
security through power measurements. They measure power
using off-the-shelf sensors present in the victim machine like
hardware counters or OS APIs [1, 37]. Such sensors are only
reliable at the time granularity of several milliseconds. At-
tackers could use alternative measurement strategies at this
timescale like malicious USB charging booths [51], compro-
mised batteries [26], thermal measurements [28], or cheap
power-meters when physical access is possible [47].
We exclude power analysis attacks that search for patterns
at a fine time granularity with special hardware support such
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as oscilloscopes [23] or antennas [16, 17]. While such attacks
are powerful enough to attack cryptographic algorithms [24],
they are harder to mount and need more expensive equip-
ment. Even with fine-grain measurement, information about
events like keystrokes can be analyzed only at the millisec-
ond timescale [26, 49].
We assume that attackers can know the algorithm used
by Maya to reshape the computer’s power. They can run
the algorithm and see its impact on the time-domain and
frequency-domain behavior of applications. Using these ob-
servations, they can develop machine learning models to
adapt to the defense and try defeating it.
Finally, we assume that the hardware or privileged soft-
ware that implements the control system to reshape the
power trace is uncompromised. In a software implementa-
tion, the OS scheduler and DVFS interfaces are assumed to
be uncompromised.
4 Falsifying Power Side-channels with
Control
We propose that a computer system defend itself against
power side-channel attacks by distorting its pattern of power
consumption. Unfortunately, this is hard to perform success-
fully. Simple distortions like adding noise to power signals
can be removed by attackers using signal processing tech-
niques. This is especially the case if, as we assume in this
paper, the attacker knows the general algorithm that the
defense uses to distort the signal. Indeed, past approaches
have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. In
this paper, we propose a new approach. In the following, we
describe the rationale behind the approach, present the high-
level architecture, and discuss how to generate the distortion
to falsify information leakage through power signals.
4.1 Why Use Control Theory Techniques?
To understand why control theory techniques are necessary
at shaping power, consider the following scenario. We mea-
sure the power consumed by an application at fixed timesteps
to record a trace, as shown in Figure 2a. To prevent informa-
tion leakage, we must distort the power trace into a different
uncorrelated shape.
Assume that the system has a mechanism to increase the
power consumed, and another to reduce it. In this paper,
these mechanisms are the ability to run a Balloon thread and
an idle thread, respectively, for a chosen amount of time.
A balloon thread is one that performs power-consuming
operations (e.g., floating-point operations) in a tight loop,
and an idle thread forces the processor into an idle state.
One way to mislead the attacker is to keep the power
consumption at another level P (Figure 2b). To achieve this,
we can measure the difference between P and the actual
power pi at each timestep and schedule a balloon thread if
P − pi > 0 or an idle thread otherwise. Unfortunately, this
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Figure 2. Example of the power trace for an application.
approach is too simplistic to be effective. First, it ignores
how the application’s power changes intrinsically. Second,
achieving the power P with this application may require a
combination of both the idle and balloon threads. When only
a balloon thread is scheduled at the 0th timestep based on
P −p0, the power in the 1st timestep would be p ′1 rather than
our target P .
If this poor control algorithm is repeatedly applied, it will
always miss the target and we obtain the trace in Figure 2b
where the measured power is not close to the target, and in
addition, has enough features of the original trace.
An approach with control theory is able to get much closer
to the target power level. This is because the controller makes
more informed power changes at every interval and can set
multiple inputs for accurate control. To understand why, we
rephrase the equations of controller operation (Equation 1)
slightly:
State(T + 1) = A × State(T ) + B × Error (T )
Action(T ) = C × State(T ) + D × Error (T ) (2)
The second equation shows that the action taken at time T
(in our case, scheduling the balloon and idle threads) is a
function of the tracking error observed at timeT (in our case,
P-p0) and the controller’s state. The state is a summary of
the controller’s experience in regulating the application. The
new state used in the next timestep is determined by the cur-
rent state and error serving as an “accumulated experience”
to smoothly and quickly reach the target.
Further, the controller’s actions and state evolution are
influenced by the matricesA, B,C , and D, which were gener-
ated when the controller was designed. This design includes
running a training set of applications while scheduling the
balloon and idle threads and measuring the resulting power
changes. Consequently, these matrices embed the intrinsic
behavior of the applications under these conditions.
Overall, with a control theory controller the measured
power trace will be much closer to the target signal. If the
target signal is chosen appropriately, the attacker can longer
recover the application information.
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4.2 High-Level Architecture
The high-level architecture of a system that uses control
theory techniques to reshape the power trace of a computer
system is shown in Figure 3. It is composed of a Mask Gen-
erator and a Controller. The Mask Generator decides what
should the target power be at each time, so that it canmislead
any attacker. It continuously communicates its target power
to the controller. In the example of Section 4.1, the Mask
Generator would pass the constant value P to the controller.
Section 4.3 discusses more advanced cases that involve pass-
ing a time-varying function.
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Figure 3. High-level architecture of a system that falsifies
the power trace of an application.
The controller reads this target and the actual power con-
sumed by the computer system, as given by power sensors.
Then, based on its current state, it actuates on various inputs
of the computer system, which will bring the power close to
the target power. Some of the possible actuations are: chang-
ing the frequency and voltage of the computer system, and
scheduling the balloon thread or the idle thread.
The space of power side-channel attack environments is
broad, which calls for different architectures. Table 1 shows
two representative environments, which we call Conven-
tional and Specialized environments. The Conventional en-
vironment is one where the attacker extracts information
through off-the-shelf sensors such as power counters or OS
API [49]. Such sensors are typically reliable only at coarse
measurement granularities – e.g., every 20ms. Hence, we can
use a typical matrix-based controller, like the one described
in Section 2.2, which can respond in 5–10µs. Given these
timescales, the controller can actuate on parameters such
as frequency or voltage, or schedule balloon or idle threads.
Such controllers can be used to hide what application is
running, or what keystroke is being pressed.
The Specialized environment is one where the attacker ex-
tracts information using specialized hardware devices, such
as oscilloscopes. The frequency of samples can be in the
tens of nanoseconds. In this case, the controller has to be
very fast. Hence, it cannot use the matrix-based approach of
Section 2.2. Instead, tt has to rely on a table of pre-computed
values. Its operation involves a table look-up that determines
what action to take. This controller is implemented in hard-
ware and has a response time of no more than around 10ns.
A possible design involves actuating on a hardware mod-
ule that immediately inserts compute instructions into the
ROB or pipeline bubbles to mislead any attacker. With such a
Table 1. Two types of power side-channel environments.
Characteristic Conventional Specialized
Attacker’s sensing Reads power sensors like
counters
Uses devices like oscillo-
scopes
Sensing rate ≈ 20ms < 50ns
Controller type Matrix-based controller, in
hardware or privileged
software
Table-based controller in
hardware
Controller Re-
sponse Time
5–10µs ≈ 10ns
Example Actua-
tions
Change frequency and
voltage; schedule balloon
and idle threads
Insert instructions and
pipeline bubbles
Example Use
Cases
Hide what application
runs or what keystroke
occurred
Hide features of a crypto
algorithm
fast actuation, this type of defense can be used, for example,
to hide the features of a cryptographic algorithm.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the first type of envi-
ronment only, as it is by far the easiest to mount and widely
used.
4.3 Generating Effective Masks
To effectively mislead an attacker, it is not enough for the
defense to only be able to track power targets closely (as
discussed in Section 4.1). In addition, the defense must create
an appropriate target power signal (i.e., an appropriatemask).
The module that determines the mask to be used at each
interval is the Mask Generator.
An effective mask must protect information leaked in both
time domain and the frequency domain (i.e., after obtain-
ing its FFT) because attackers can analyze signals in either
domain.
We postulate that, to be effective, a mask must have three
properties. First, its mean and variance must change over
the time domain, to portray phase behavior (Figure 4(c) top).
Such changes will mask the original signal in the time do-
main.
The second property is that themean and variance changes
must have various rates – from smooth to abrupt. This prop-
erty will cause the resulting frequency domain curve to
spread over a range of frequencies (Figure 4(c) bottom). As
a result, the curve will a property similar to typical curves
generated natively by applications.
The final property is that the target signal must have
repeating patterns at various rates. This is to create various
peaks in the frequency domain curve (Figure 4(e) bottom).
Such peaks are common in applications, as they represent
the effects of loops.
Table 2 lists some well-known signals, showing whether
each signal changes the mean and the variance in the time
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Figure 4. Examples of different masks. In each case, the time-domain curve is at the top, and the frequency-domain one at the
bottom.
domain, and whether it creates spread and peaks in the fre-
quency domain. Such properties determine their viability
to be used as effective masks. Figure 4 shows a graphical
representation of each signal in order.
Table 2. Some standard signals and what they change in the
time and frequency domains.
Time-domain Frequency-domain
Signal Mean Variance Spread Peaks
Constant – – – –
Uniformly Random Yes – Yes –
Gaussian Yes Yes Yes –
Sinusoid Yes Yes – Yes
Gaussian Sinusoid Yes Yes Yes Yes
A Constant signal (Figure 4(a)) does not change the mean
or variance in the time domain, or create spread or peaks
in the frequency domain. Note that this signal cannot be
realized in practice. Any realistic method of keeping the
output signal constant under changing conditions would
have to first observe the outputs deviating from the targets,
and then set the inputs accordingly. Hence, the output signal
would have a burst of power activity at all the change points
in the application. As a result, such signal would easily leak
information. Furthermore, the signals obtained in multiple
runs of a given application would be similar to each other.
In a Uniformly Random signal (Figure 4(b)), a value is
chosen randomly from a range, and is used as a target for
a random duration in the time domain. After this period,
another value and duration are selected, and the process
repeats. This signal changes the mean but not the variance
in the time domain. In the frequency domain, the signal is
spread across a range but has no peaks. This mask is not
a good choice either because any repeating activity in the
application would be hard to hide in the time domain signal.
The Gaussian signal (Figure 4(c)) takes a gaussian distri-
bution and keeps changing the mean and variance randomly
in the time domain. The resulting frequency-domain signal
is spread over multiple frequencies, but does not have peaks.
The Sinusoid signal (Figure 4(d)) generates a sinusoid and
keeps changing the frequency, the amplitude, and the offset
(i.e., the power at angle 0 of the sinusoid) randomly with
time. This signal changes the mean and variance in the time
domain. In the frequency domain, it has clear sharp peaks
at each of its sine wave frequencies. However, there is no
spread. Therefore, this signal is not effective at masking
abrupt changes in the native power output of applications.
Finally, the Gaussian Sinusoid (Figure 4(e)) is the addition
of the previous two signals. This signal has all the properties
that we want. The mean and variance in the time domain,
and the peak locations in the frequency domain are varied by
changing the parameters of the sinusoid. The gaussian com-
ponent widens the peaks in the frequency domain, causing
spread. This is the mask that we propose.
5 Implementation on Two Systems
We implement Maya as the system shown in Figure 3. We
target the Conventional environment, shown in the center of
Table 1, as it is by far the most frequent one. We implement
Maya in software, as OS threads, in two different machines.
System One (Sys1) is a consumer class machine with 6 cores.
Each core supports 2 hardware contexts, totaling 12 logical
cores. System Two (Sys2) is a server class machine with 2
sockets, each having 10 cores of 2 hardware contexts, for a
total of 40 logical cores.
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On both systems, the processors are Intel Sandybridge.
The OS is CentOS 7.6, based on the Linux kernel version
3.10. On each context, we run one of three possible threads:
a thread of a parallel benchmark, an idle thread, or a balloon
thread. The latter is one thread of a parallel program that
we call the Balloon program, which performs floating-point
array operations in a loop to raise the power consumed.
Both the benchmark and the Balloon program have as many
threads as logical cores.
In each system, the controller measures one output and
actuates on three inputs. The output is the total power con-
sumed by the chip(s). The inputs are the DVFS level applied,
the percentage of idle thread execution, and the percentage
of balloon program execution.
DVFS values can be changed from 1.2 GHz to 2.0 GHz
on Sys1, and from 1.2 GHz to 2.6 GHz on Sys2, with 0.1
GHz increments in either case. On both systems, idle thread
execution can be set from 0% to 48% in steps of 4%, and the
balloon program execution from 0% to 100% in steps of 10%.
Power consumption is measured through RAPL inter-
faces [32]. The DVFS level is set using the cpufreq interface.
The idle thread setting is specified through Intel’s Power
Clamp interface [44]. The balloon program setting is speci-
fied through an shm file. The controller, mask generator, and
balloon program run as privileged processes.
5.1 Designing the Controller
We design the controller using robust control theory [41].
To develop it, we need to: (i) design a dynamic model of
the computer system running the applications, and (ii) set
three parameters of the controller (Section 2.2), namely the
input weights, the uncertainty guardband, and the output
deviation bounds [41].
To develop themodel, we use the System Identification [27]
experimental modeling methodology. In this approach, we
run training applications on the computer system and, dur-
ing execution, change the system inputs.We log the observed
outputs and the inputs. From the data, we construct a dy-
namic polynomial model of the computer system:
y(T ) = a1 × y(T − 1) + . . . + am × y(T −m)+
b1 × u(T ) + . . . + bn × u(T − n + 1) (3)
In this equation, y(T) and u(T) are the outputs and inputs, re-
spectively, at time T. This model describes the outputs at any
time T as a function of the m past outputs, and the current
and n-1 past inputs. The constants ai and bi are obtained by
least squares minimization from the experimental data [27].
We perform system identification by running two applica-
tions from PARSEC 3.0 (swaptions and ferret) and two from
SPLASH2x (barnes and raytrace) [11] on Sys1. The models
we obtain have a dimension of 4 (i.e.,m = n = 4 in Equa-
tion 3). The system identification approach is powerful to
capture the relationship between the inputs and outputs.
The input weights are set depending on the relative over-
head of changing each input. In our system, all inputs have
similar changing overheads. Hence, we set all the input
weights to 1. Next, we specify the uncertainty guardband by
evaluating several choices. For each uncertainty guardband
choice, Matlab tools [18] give the smallest output deviation
bounds the controller can provide. Based on prior work [33],
we set the guardband to be 40%, which allows the output
deviation bounds for power to be within 10%.
With themodel and these specifications, standard tools [18]
generate the set of matrices that encode the controller (Sec-
tion 2.2). This controller’s dimension is 11 i.e. the number
of elements in the state vector of Equation 1 is 11. The con-
troller runs periodically every 20 ms. We set this duration
based on the update rate of the power sensors.
5.2 Mask Generator
As indicated in Section 4.3, our choice of mask is a gaussian
sinusoid (Figure 4(e)). This signal is the sum of a sinusoid
and a gaussian, and its value as a function to time (T) is:
O f f set +Amp × sin(2π ×T
Freq
) + Noise(µ,σ ) (4)
where the Offset, Amp, Freq, µ and σ parameters keep chang-
ing. Each of these parameters is selected at random from a
range of values, subject to two constraints. First, the maxi-
mum power cannot be over the Thermal Design Power (TDP)
of the system. Second, the frequency has to be smaller than
half of the power sampling frequency; otherwise, the sampler
would not be able to identify the curve. Once a particular set
of parameters is chosen, the mask generator uses them for
Nhold samples, after which the parameters are updated again.
Nhold itself varies randomly between 6 to 120 samples.
6 Evaluation Methodology
We analyze the security offered by Maya in two ways. First,
we consider two machine learning-based power analysis
attacks and evaluate howMaya can prevent them. Second, we
use signal processing metrics to evaluate the power-shaping
properties of Maya.
6.1 Machine Learning Based Power Attacks
Pattern recognition is at the core of nearly all power anal-
ysis attacks [19, 24, 26, 46, 49]. Therefore, we use multiple
machine learning-based attacks to test Maya.
1. Detecting the Active Application: This is a fundamen-
tal attack that is reported in several works [19, 26, 46, 49].
The goal is to infer the application running on the system
using power traces. Initially, attackers gather several power
traces of the applications that must be detected, and train a
machine learning classifier to predict the application from
the power trace. Then, they use this classifier to predict
which application is creating a new signal from the system.
This attack tells the attackers whether a power signal is of
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use to the them, and enables them to identify more serious
information from the power trace. For example, if the attack-
ers know that the power signal belongs to a video encoder,
they can infer that the repeating patterns in it correspond to
successive frames being encoded.
We implement this attack on Sys1 using applications from
PARSEC 3.0 (blackscholes, bodytrack, freqmine, raytrace,
and vips) and SPLASH2x (radiosity, water_nsquared, and
water_spatial). We run each application 1,000 times with na-
tive datasets on Sys1 and collect a total of 8,000 power traces.
We collect power measurements using unprivileged RAPL
counters – an ideal case for an attacker because this does not
need physical access and has accurate measurements. For
robust classification under noise, we configure the machine
in each run with a different frequency and level of idle activity
before launching the application. The idle activity results in
a noisy power trace because of the interference between the
idle threads and the actual applications.
From each trace, we extract multiple segments of 15,000
RAPL measurements, and average the 5 consecutive mea-
surements in each segment to remove effects of noise. This
reduces each segment length to 3,000. Then, we convert the
values in the segment into one-hot representation by quan-
tizing the values into one of 10 levels encoded in one-hot
format. This gives us 30,000-long samples that we feed into
a classifier. Among the samples from all traces, we use 60%
of them for training, 20% for validation, and leave 20% as the
test set.
Our classifier is a multilayer perceptron neural network
with two hidden ReLU layers of dimensions 1,500 and 600.
The output layer uses Logsoftmax and has 8 nodes, corre-
sponding to the 8 applications we classify. With this model,
we achieve a training accuracy of 99%, and validation and
test accuracies of 92%.
2. Detecting the Application Data: This attack is used to
infer the differences in data that a given application uses –
such as the websites accessed by a browser, or the videos
processed by an encoder. This is also a common attack de-
scribed in multiple works [26, 31, 46, 49, 51]. We implement
this attack on Sys2 targeting the ffmpeg video encoding appli-
cation [15]. We use three videos saved in raw format: tractor,
riverbed and wind. They are commonly used for video test-
ing [48]. We transcode each video with x264 compression
using ffmpeg and record the power trace. Since the power
consumed by video encoding depends on the content of the
frames, each video has a distinct power pattern.
We collect the power traces from 300 runs of encoding
each video with different frequency and idle activity levels.
Next, we choose multiple windows of 1,000 measurements
from each trace. As with the previous attack, we average
5 consecutive measurements and use on-hot encoding to
obtain samples that are 2,000 values long.
The classifier for this attack is also a multilayer perceptron
neural network with two hidden ReLU layers of dimensions
100 and 40. The output layer uses Logsoftmax and has 3
nodes corresponding to the 3 videos we classify. With this
model, we achieve training, validation and test accuracies of
99%.
3. Adaptive Attacks: We consider an advanced scenario
where the attacker records the distorted power traces of
applications when Maya is running, and knows which ap-
plication is running. She then trains models to perform the
previous attacks. The data collection and model training is
the same as described above.
6.2 Signal Processing Analysis
In addition to the machine learning attacks, we analyze
Maya’s distortion using the following signal processing met-
rics.
1. Signal Averaging: Averaging multiple power signals re-
moves random noise in the signals, allowing attackers to
detect even small changes. We test this using signal averag-
ing analysis on Sys1. For each application, we collect three
sets of 1,000 noisy power signals with: (i) noMaya, (ii)Maya
Constant, and (iii) Maya Gaussian Sinusoid. When Maya is
not used, noise is created by changing frequency and idle
activity. Then, we average the signals for each application
and analyze the distribution of values in the averaged sig-
nals. Effective obfuscation would cause the values in the
averaged traces to be distributed in the same manner across
applications.
2. Change Detection: This is a signal processing technique
used to identify times when the properties of a signal change.
The properties can be the signal mean, variance, edges, or
fourier coefficients. We use a standard Change Point Detec-
tion algorithm [29] to compare the change points found in
the baseline and in the re-shaped signals on Sys2.
7 EvaluatingMaya
7.1 Evading Machine Learning Attacks
Application Detection Attack: Figure 5 shows the confu-
sion matrices for performing the application detection attack
and its adaptive variant on Sys1. The rows of the matrix cor-
respond to the true labels of the traces and the columns are
the predicted labels by the machine learning models. The 8
applications we detect are numbered from 0 to 7. A cell in
the ith row and jth column of the matrix lists the fraction of
traces belonging to label i that were classified as j. Values
close to 1 along the diagonal indicate accurate prediction.
We use Baseline to refer to the environment without Maya,
and Obfuscated to refer when Maya runs.
Recall that the model trained on Noisy Baseline signals can
classify unobfuscated signals with 92% accuracy. When this
classifier is applied to signals producedwhenMaya runs with
a Constant mask, the accuracy drops to 12% (average of the
diagonal values in Figure 5a). However, when an advanced
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Figure 5. Confusion matrices for a machine learning attack to identify the active application from power signals. The figures
are labeled in the format: Train dataset→ Test dataset and the average accuracy is in parenthesis. Higher fractions are in
darker squares.
attacker trains on the obfuscated traces, the classification
accuracy is 67% (Figure 5b).
The poor security offered by a Constant mask in the ad-
vanced attack is due to two reasons. First, it cannot hide the
natural power variations of an application as described in
Section 4.3. Second, the power signals of an application with
a Constant mask are similar across multiple runs. Hence,
a Constant mask is ineffective at preventing information
leakage.
Next, consider the Gaussian Sinusoid mask. When a Noisy
Baseline-trained classifier is used, the accuracy is 13% (Fig-
ure 5c). Even in an Adaptive attack that trains on the ob-
fuscated traces, the classification accuracy is only 20% (Fig-
ure 5d). This indicates an excellent obfuscation, considering
that the random-chance of guessing the correct application
is 13%. The Gaussian Sinusoid introduces several types of
variation in the power signals, effectively eliminating any
original patterns. Moreover, each run with this mask gen-
erates a new form. Therefore, there is no common pattern
between different runs that a machine learning module could
learn.
Video Data Detection Attack: Figure 6 shows the confu-
sion matrices for the attack that identifies the video being en-
coded on Sys2. Recall that the attack has to choose among one
of three videos for each power trace. The classifier trained
on baseline signals had a 99% test accuracy in predicting the
video from the baseline traces. The classification accuracy
when using this model on signals with Maya’s Constant
mask is 21% (Figure 6a). However, the accuracy rises to 79%
when the attacker is able to train with the power signals
generated by Maya using the constant mask (Figure 6b).
When the Gaussian Sinusoid mask is used, the classifica-
tion accuracy when using the Noisy Baseline-trained model
is 34% (Figure 6c). Even when the attacker trains with ob-
fuscated traces, the classification accuracy is only 39%(Fig-
ure 6d). This is a high degree of obfuscation because the
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Figure 6. Confusion matrices for a machine learning attack
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as in Figure 5.
random-chance of assigning the correct video to a power
signal is 33%.
Overall, the results from the machine learning-based at-
tacks establish that Maya with the Gaussian Sinusoid mask
is successful in falsifying pattern recognition attacks.Maya’s
strength is highlighted when it resisted the attacks where the
attacker could record thousands of signals generated from
Maya. This comes from using an effective mask (Gaussian
Sinusoid) and a control-theory controller that keeps power
close to the mask. Finally, the results also show the Constant
8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Applications
8
10
12
14
16
18
P
ow
er
 (
W
)
(a) Noisy Baseline
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Applications
20
21
22
23
24
P
ow
er
 (
W
)
(b) Maya Constant
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Applications
16.5
17
17.5
18
18.5
19
P
ow
er
 (
W
)
(c) Maya Gaussian Sinusoid
Figure 7. Summary statistics of the average of 1,000 signals. The Y axis of each chart is drawn to a different scale.
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Figure 8. Average of 1,000 signals over time samples. The Y axis of each chart is drawn to a different scale.
mask to be ineffective because it does not have all the needed
traits of a mask.
7.2 Signal Processing Analysis
Signal Averaging: Figure 7 shows the box plots of value
distribution in the averaged traces from Sys1 with the Noisy
Baseline,Maya Constant mask, andMaya Gaussian Sinusoid
mask. The applications are labeled on the horizontal axis
from 0 to 7. There is a box plot for each application. Each box
shows the 25th and 75th percentile values for the application.
The line inside the box is the median value. The whiskers
of the box extend up to values not considered as statistical
outliers. The statistical outliers are shown by a tail of ‘+’
markers. Note that the Y axis on the three charts is different
– Figures 7b and 7c have a magnified view of the values for
legibility.
With the Noisy Baseline, the average trace of each applica-
tion has a distinct distribution of values, leaving a fingerprint
of that application. With a Constant mask, the median val-
ues of the applications are closer than they were with the
Baseline. The lengths of the boxes do not differ as much as
they did with the Baseline. Unfortunately, each application
has a different statistical fingerprint sufficient to distinguish
it from the others.
Finally, with Maya Gaussian Sinusoid mask, the distribu-
tions are near-identical. This is because the patterns in each
run are not correlated with those in other runs. Therefore,
averaging multiple Maya signals cancels out the patterns
— simply leaving a constant-like value with small variance.
Hence, the median, mean, variance, and the distribution of
the samples are very close. Note that the resolution of this
data is 0.01W, indicating a high degree of obfuscation.
To highlight the differences further, Figure 8 shows the
averaged signals of three applications over timesteps for the
Noisy Baseline,Maya Constant andMaya Gaussian Sinusoid.
Again, the Y axis for Figures 8b and 8c is magnified for leg-
ibility. With Noisy Baseline, after the noise is removed by
the averaging effect, the patterns in the averaged signals of
each application are clearly visible. Further, these patterns
are different for each application.
When the Constant mask is used, the magnitude of the
variation is lower, but the lines are not identical across ap-
plications. The pattern of blackscholes is clearly visible.
With the Gaussian Sinusoid mask, the average signal of
an application has only a small variance, and is close to the
average signals of the other applications. As a result, the
average traces of different applications are indistinguishable,
and do not resemble the baseline at all. This results in the
highest degree of obfuscation.
Change Point Detection:We present the highlights of this
analysis using blackscholes on Sys2. We monitor the execu-
tion for 100 s, even if the application completes before 100 s.
Figure 9 shows the power signals in the time and frequency
domains for blackscholes with the Noisy Baseline, Maya
Constant, and Maya Gaussian Sinusoid. The time-domain
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Figure 9. Change point detection in blackscholes on Sys2. The top row shows the time-domain signals, along with the detected
phases. The bottom row shows the frequency-domain signals.
plots also show the detected phases from the change point
algorithm.
In the Noisy Baseline (Figure 9a), the difference between
the different phases is less visible due to interference from
the idle threads. Nonetheless, the algorithm detects four
major phases. They correspond to the sequential, parallel,
sequential, and fully idle activity, respectively. The sudden
changes between phases can be seen as a small spike in the
FFT tail of this signal.
Figure 9b shows blackscholeswith a Constantmask. Change
point analysis reveals changes in the signal at 20s, 40s and
60s, yielding four phases. These phases can be related di-
rectly to those in the Baseline signal because the Constant
mask does not introduce artificial changes. The change in
signal variance between these phases is visible from the time
series. Also, the FFT tail has a small spike at the same loca-
tion as with the Baseline. As a result, the attacker can easily
identify this signal.
Figure 9c shows the behavior with the Gaussian Sinusoid
mask. Change point analysis detects several instances of
phase change, but these are all artificial. Notice that the FFT
of this signal is different from the Baseline FFT, eliminating
any identity of the application. Finally, it is also not possible to
infer when the application execution is complete. Specifically,
the application actually completed around 55 s, but the power
signal has no distinguishing change at that time.
7.3 Effectiveness of a Control-Theory Controller
Figure 10 shows the target power given by a Maya Gaussian
Sinusoid mask generator during one execution of blacksc-
holes on Sys1 (a), and the actual power that was measured
from the computer (b). It can be seen that the control-theory
controller is effective at making the measured power appear
close to the target mask. This is thanks to the advantages of
using a MIMO control theoretic controller. Indeed, this accu-
rate tracking is what helps Maya in effectively re-shaping
the system’s power and hide application activity.
7.4 Overheads and Power-Performance Impact
Finally, we examine the overheads and the power-performance
impact of Maya.
Overheads ofMaya: The controller reads one output, sets
three inputs and, it can be shown, has a state vector x(T )
that is 11-element long (Equation 1). Therefore, the controller
needs less than 1 KB of storage. At each invocation, it per-
forms ≈200 fixed-point operations to make a decision. This
completes within one µs.
The Mask Generator requires (pseudo) random numbers
from a Gaussian distribution to compute the mask (Equa-
tion 4). It also needs another set of random numbers to set
the properties of the Gaussian distribution and the Sinusoid.
In our implementation, we use a software library that takes
less than 10 µs to generate all our random numbers. For a
hardware implementation, there are off-the-shelf hardware
instructions and IP modules to obtain these random numbers
in sub-µs [20, 21].
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Figure 10. Target and measured powers for a run of blacksc-
holes with Maya Gaussian Sinusoid on Sys1, showing the
high-fidelity power-shaping with control theory.
Maya needs few resources to control the system, making
Maya attractive for both hardware and software implementa-
tions. The primary bottlenecks in our implementation were
the sensing and actuation latencies, which are in the ms time
scale.
Application-Level Impact:We run the PARSEC and SPLASH2x
applications on Sys1 and Sys2, with and without Maya, to
measure the power and performance overheads. Our Base-
line configuration runs at the highest available frequency
without interference from the idle threads or the balloon
program. It offers no security. We also evaluate the Noisy
Baseline design, in which the system runs with a random
DVFS level and percentage of idle activity.
Figure 11 shows the power and execution time of the
Noisy Baseline,Maya Constant andMaya Gaussian Sinusoid
environments normalized to that of the high-performance
Baseline. From Figure 11a, we see that the average power
consumed by the applications with the three environments
is 35%, 41%, and 29% lower than that of the high performance
Baseline, respectively. The power is lower due to the idle
threads and low DVFS values that appear in these environ-
ments.
Figure 11b shows the normalized execution times with the
Noisy Baseline,Maya Constant, andMayaGaussian Sinusoid
environments. These environments have, on average, perfor-
mance slowdowns of 63%, 100% and 50% respectively, over
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Figure 11. Overheads of our environments on Sys1 relative
to a high-performance insecure Baseline.
the Baseline. Maya Constant uses a single power target that
is lower than the maximum power at which Baseline runs.
Therefore, its performance is the worst. On the other hand,
Maya Gaussian Sinusoid spans multiple power levels in the
available range, allowing applications to run at higher power
occasionally. As a result, execution times are relatively better.
Maya Gaussian Sinusoid also has a better performance than
Noisy Baseline and offers high security.
It can be shown that the power and performance over-
heads of our environments in Sys2 are similar to those in
Sys1 shown in Figure 11. This shows that our methodology
is robust across different machine configurations.
One approach to reduce the slowdown from Maya is to
enable obfuscation only on demand. Authenticated users or
secure applications can activate Maya before commencing a
secure-sensitive task, and stop Maya once the task is com-
plete. While this approach gives away the information that
a secure task is being run, at least does not slow down all
applications.
7.5 Overall Remarks
Usingmachine learning-based attacks and signal analysis, we
showed how theMayaGaussian Sinusoidmask can obfuscate
power signals from a computer. Maya’s security comes from
an effective mask, and from the control-theoretic controller
that can shape the computer’s power into the givenmask.We
implemented Maya on two different machines without modi-
fying the controller or the mask generator, demonstrating
our proposal’s robustness, security and ease of deployment
on existing computers.
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8 Related Work
Power, temperature, and EM emissions from a computer
are a set of physical side channels that have been used by
many attackers to compromise security [24, 55, 56]. Kocher et
al. [24] give a detailed overview of attacks exploiting power
signals with Simple Power analysis (SPA) and Differential
Power Analysis (DPA).
Machine Learning (ML) is commonly-used to perform
power analysis attacks. Using ML, Yan et al. developed an
attack to identify the running application, login screens and
the number of keystrokes typed by the user [49]. Lifshits et
al. considered malicious smart batteries and demonstrated
another attack that predicted the character of a keystroke
and user’s personal information such as browser, camera, and
location activity [26]. Yang et al. snooped the power drawn
by a mobile phone from a public USB charging booth to
predict the user’s browser activity. Hlavacs et al. showed that
the virtual machines running on a server could be identified
using power signals [19]. Finally, Wei et al. used ML to detect
malware from power signals [47].
Other attacks are even more sophisticated. Michalevsky
et al. developed a malicious smartphone application that
could track the user’s location using OS-level power coun-
ters, without reading the GPS module [31]. Schellenberg et
al. showed how malicious on-board modules can measure
another chip’s power activity [39].
As power, temperature, and EM emissions are correlated,
attackers used temperature and EM measurements to iden-
tify application activity [2, 13, 16, 17, 22, 46]. These attacks
have targeted many environments, like smart cards, mo-
bile systems, laptops, and IoT devices. Recently, Masti et al.
showed how temperature can be used to identify another
core’s activity in multicores [28]. This broadens the threat
from physical side channels because attackers can read EM
signals from a distance, or measure temperature through co-
location, even when the system does not support per-core
power counters.
Several countermeasures against power side channels
have been proposed [7, 14, 24, 38, 42, 52, 53, 55]. They usually
operate along one of two principles: keep power consump-
tion invariant to any activity [14, 34, 38, 42, 54], or make
power consumption noisy such that the impact of appli-
cation activity is lost [24, 55]. A common approach is to
randomize DVFS using special hardware [7, 52, 52]. Avir-
neni and Somani also propose new circuits for randomizing
DVFS, and change voltage and frequency independently [7].
Baddam and Zwolinski showed that randomizing DVFS
is not a viable defense because attackers can identify clock
frequency changes through high-resolution power traces [8].
Yang et al. proposed using random task scheduling at the OS
level in addition to new hardware for randomly setting the
processor frequency and clock phase [50]. Real et al. showed
that simple approaches to introduce noise or empty activity
into the system can be filtered out [35].
Trusted execution environments like Intel SGX [30] or
ARM Trustzone [6] can sandbox the architectural events
of applications. However, they do not establish boundaries
for physical signals. One approach for power side channel
isolation is blinking [3], where a circuit is temporarily cut-off
from the outside and is run with a small amount of energy
stored inside itself [3].
To the best of our knowledge, Maya is the first defense
against power side channels that uses control theory.
9 Conclusions
This paper presented a simple and effective solution against
power side channels. The idea, called Maya, is to use a
controller from control theory to distort, in an application-
transparent way, the power consumed by an application –
so that the attacker cannot obtain information. With control
theory techniques, the controller can keep outputs close to
desired targets even when runtime conditions change un-
predictably. Then, by changing these targets appropriately,
Maya makes the power signal appear to carry activity infor-
mation which, in reality, is unrelated to the program. Maya
controllers can be implemented in privileged software or in
simple hardware. In this paper, we implemented Maya on
two multiprocessor machines using OS threads, and showed
that it is very effective at falsifying application activity.
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